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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	USSR (Moscow Oblast)	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Soviet Institute near the Yaroslavskaya Railroad Station	DATE DISTR.	10 March 1954
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PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	50X1

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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Comments:

1. For Yaroslavsky Railroad Station throughout the report, read Yaroslavskaya Railroad Station.
2. For Krasnoarmeyskiy throughout the report, read Krasnoarmeysk.
3. For technical ~~soviet~~ throughout the report, read technical congress.
4. For "Molnya" in Paragraph 3 and following, read "Molniya".
5. For ZAKHANITZKY in Paragraph 6a, read ZAKHANITSKIY.
6. For Ministry of Heavy Industry on Page 4, read Ministry of Heavy Machine Building.
7. On Page 4, S. N. I. P. stands for Sofrino Scientific Experimental Station.
8. For TSHERNIAK in Paragraph 11, read ChERNYAK.

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REPORT

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COUNTRY : USSR

DATE DISTR. 20 JAN 54

SUBJECT : Soviet Institute Near The Yaroslavsky Rail-  
road Station

NO. OF PAGES 7

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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INTRODUCTION

[redacted] Comment: [redacted] made reference to a "Soviet Research Institute" located near the Yaroslavsky rail-  
road station in Moscow. During a reinterrogation attempts were made to obtain  
additional data on this Soviet installation. It was found that although  
[redacted] visited the "Institute" twice during the year 1947, he has  
only a vague knowledge of its activity and none on its organization,  
nor was he able to supply the exact location and the "Institute's"  
lay-out. Furthermore [redacted] is not certain that this installation is an  
Institute. [redacted] "INSTITUTE" 50X1-HUM

1. I believe that a Soviet Institute which was engaged in missile and  
research and development work was located near the Yaroslavsky rail-  
road station in Moscow. I base this on the following:

- a. [redacted] during 1947 I was summoned to address technical soviets  
for details see pages 5 - 6 held at this installation. 50X1-HUM
- b. While working on Soviet sponsored projects at KB No.3 (Design  
Bureau) in Krasnoarmeyskiy, we were repeatedly exhorted to  
improve the performance of our designs. This exhortation was  
usually coupled with statements that the performance of our

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projected designs was inferior to the one obtained by the competing Soviet Institute. When referring to the competing Institute the Soviet engineers at KB No.3 may have actually used the description "Institute near Yaroslavy station" or "DYATLOV Institute." But whether this was true or not, the German specialists always thought that the reference was to the installation at which [ ] German specialists at KB No.3 [ ] had given lectures.

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- c. We often received visits at KB No.3 from the Soviet official DYATLOV. I believe that DYATLOV was introduced as the chief of the Moscow Institute. I saw him at the technical Soviets and though I cannot reconstruct the exact details, DYATLOV's bearing throughout these meetings strengthened my belief that he was the chief of that installation. Other visitors at KB No.3 from this installation were generally referred to as coming from the competing Institute. However, except for the persons listed below, I do not remember any other Soviets.

#### LOCATION OF INSTITUTE

2. The Institute was located in the vicinity of the Yaroslavy railroad station. I do not remember the exact location and can only reconstruct its approximate location /see page 7 which is an overlay to USAF Target Complex Mosaic [ ]/. When attending the technical Soviets, I left by car from Krasnoarmeyskiy to Moscow. The only striking landmark which I remember in Moscow was the aforementioned railroad station which the car passed shortly before our arrival at the Institute. From here we proceeded along a tree lined boulevard which led to a sparsely populated area on the northern periphery of Moscow where the installation was situated. The trip from the railroad station to the building required approximately ten minutes, and covers a distance of approximately 2.5 kilometers.

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#### ACTIVITIES OF INSTITUTE

3. I believe that the Institute, which I heard was equipped with elaborate laboratories and experimental workshops, was engaged among other things in the following work:
- a. Design on the projects "ABRS 220" and "Molnya" which paralleled the work of my group at KB No.3.
  - b. Design work which paralleled the work of the Schaad-Boehm group at KB No.3 on the "Panzerfaust" project.
  - c. I believe that the Institute did further work on the reconstruction and possible modification of the German wartime missile, "HS-15."
4. The belief that the Soviets worked on the projects outlined above is based on the fact, already cited, that the Soviets generally urged us to improve our performance in regard to "ABRS 220" and "Molnya" in order to keep pace with the

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competing Institute in Moscow. Furthermore, there were occasional requests for added information or clarification. These requests I believe came from the Institute near the Yaroslavy railway station. I do not remember why I thought the requests came from this installation; it may well have been that this was actually stated by the Soviet supervisor at KB No.3. From these requests for additional data and from the lectures held at the technical soviets, I surmised that our projects listed above were paralleled by the Soviets in Moscow.

5. The "Panzerfaust" project of the Schaad-Boehm group was probably paralleled there also because SCHAADT addressed a technical soviet at this installation during 1947. I do not believe that the Institute worked on remote controlled missiles, but I do not have any concrete evidence on which to base this contention.

#### ORGANIZATION AND PERSONALITIES AT INSTITUTE

6. I have little information on the organization of the Institute, except that I believe it is supervised by the Armament Division of the All-Union Ministry for Agricultural Machine Building (M.S.Kh.M.), I base this on the following:

- a. The technical soviets were attended by General ZAKHANITZKY, who was the head of the Armament Section of the Ministry for Agricultural Machine Building (M.S.Kh.M.).
- b. The chief and other Soviet officials from the Institute visited the KB No. 3 which was subordinate to the Ministry, M.S.Kh.M. There was also a lively exchange of information between KB No.3 and the Institute.
- c. Personnel attached to this Institute carried out firing tests between 1947 and 1950 at the S.N.I.P. firing range in Krasnoarmeyskiy, which was subordinate to the Ministry, M.S.Kh.M.

7. I am certain that the Institute had no German specialists assigned. I base this on the fact that I did not see any Germans other than KB No.3 specialists at the technical soviets.

8. Of the Soviet engineers assigned to the Institute, I remember only DYATLOV, SOKOLOV and STRELKOV. The first was generally identified as the chief of the Institute. [redacted] when they attended the technical soviets. While this does not constitute conclusive evidence that they are employed by the Institute I believe that they occasionally visited in Krasnoarmeyskiy and that Soviet co-workers at the KB No.3 referred to them as members of the competing Institute.

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DYATLOV

DYATLOV [redacted] at Gema in Berlin where he was the Soviet chief.

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[redacted] His rank in Berlin was colonel.

[redacted] I think that he is a good administrator. He left Berlin for the USSR around the end

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of 1946 and presumably took charge of the Institute in the beginning of 1947. I believe he still held that post when we left the USSR [redacted] Until 1950 he was a not infrequent visitor at KB No. 3. Afterwards his visits became very rare.

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SOKOLOV

[redacted] after the war in Berlin [redacted] he was a member of the Rhein-Metall dismantling unit of Colonel GLAVSUD which in turn was part of the dismantling commission headed by General SABUROV, who today heads the Ministry of Heavy Industry in the USSR. I did not see SOKOLOV during my assignment at Gema in 1946, but upon our arrival in Moscow [redacted] where he headed the reception committee welcoming the German specialists.

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[redacted] SOKOLOV occasionally during the years 1947 to 1950 [redacted] visited the S.N.I.P. firing range in Krasnoarmeyskiy, where he may have tested some equipment. The details however are not known to me. I believe that during these visits he was accompanied by STRELKOV (see below) from which I gather that they worked in unison. It is very likely that SOKOLOV attended the soviets at the Institute. In Berlin I had the impression that SOKOLOV had a rather one-sided training and that his experience was confined to research on solid propellant missiles.

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STRELKOV

[redacted] in Berlin [redacted] SOKOLOV [redacted] was assigned to the Soviet dismantling unit in Rhein-Metall (see above). His rank in Berlin was major.

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[redacted] I did not see him during my assignment at Gema [redacted] In Krasnoarmeyskiy, I saw him occasionally when he visited the S.N.I.P. firing range. His activity there was not known to me. I believe that I also saw him at the technical soviets at the Institute in Moscow.

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TECHNICAL SOVIETS HELD AT THE INSTITUTE

9. [redacted] Comments Since the two technical soviets (conferences attended by Soviet engineers and officials) at this Institute [redacted] were held six years ago, the circumstances attending this incident are only vaguely remembered. [redacted] found it particularly difficult to distinguish clearly between events that occurred during the first and the second soviet and this led to some obvious inconsistencies. Made aware of the contradiction, [redacted] offered the version which is presented below. While this may not be the correct version, it at least resolves the inconsistencies of the earlier statements.

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First Technical Soviet

10. During the beginning of 1947 while I was preparing the report on the ABRS 220, I was instructed that the report should be suitable for a lecture which would review the work thus far performed on the ABRS 220. The project had not been fully completed at this time and the report in question was one of several phase reports which we made as the work progressed. I turned the report over to Lt. Colonel RYATPOV who at that time was in charge of KB No.3.
11. On the day of the conference together with the German specialists, TAEUBERT, BACHMANN [redacted] and SCHAADT, (the leader of the SCHAADT group) and the Soviet interpreter TSHERNIAK, I left by car for Moscow. It is possible that this group included the German specialist EISENKRAEMER [redacted]. Upon arrival we were led to an auditorium which was partially filled with Soviets many of whom wore military dress. There [redacted] a resume of the work that had been performed [redacted] on the "ABRS 220." 50X1-HUM
12. I do not remember any further details, but I suppose that SCHAADT addressed the soviet as well. In view of the fact that the first soviet was held prior to our completion of the ABRS 220 project I think its purpose was primarily informatory. That is, the Soviets wanted a general account of the direction our work was taking. Also it is very probable that the Institute in Moscow and the KB No.3 were engaged in fulfilling the same technical requirements, and the Soviets at the Institute wanted to insure themselves against possible surprises issuing from the work of the German specialists at KB No.3. This explanation is valid also for the second soviet. 50X1-HUM

Second Technical Soviet

13. The second technical conference was held during the middle of 1947 when the paper design work on the "Molnya" project had been completed [redacted] but prior to the construction of the test model. At the time of the soviet we were engaged in making plans for the firing and flight tests to determine which of several design variants was most effective. (The tests were carried out after the soviet.) 50X1-HUM
14. Again the conference room was filled with Soviet military and civilian officials, though the number, between 40 and 50 this time, was larger. [redacted] do not remember the German specialists that accompanied us from KB No.3, but it is possible that TROMMSDORF [STIB source] was among them. 50X1-HUM
15. [redacted] 50X1-HUM
- The Soviets may have been more precise, in any event I was certain that the reference to a comparative "Soviet design" alluded to the design which had been offered by the Institute headed by DYATLOV.

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
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16. The Soviets stated further that each group had contributed some new ideas and that an attempt would be made to incorporate the best features of each design. While I do not remember precisely the points that were raised, I think that it was mentioned that the German design had gone far beyond the Soviet design in regard to the control features located within the carrier plane. Regarding this control feature they asked whether it was possible to use the radio fire control unit for other airborne missiles. I answered that with minor dimensional changes the unit might be used with any missile.
17. I am not certain but I do not think that any definite instructions were given to us by the soviet outlining our future development work on the "Molnya."

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